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Abstract
The South African Constitution requires men to be feminist
Can a man be a feminist? If so, what would it mean? I want to participate in 
a dialogue between women and men on how to accommodate women's 
moral concerns. I propose that the fundamental values of justice embodied 
in the South African constitutional democracy require men to be feminist. 
These values provide the best safeguard of the important interests and 
values of both women and men. Men who accept these values can support 
the main concerns of feminism. The implications of the argument in this 
article range from public issues to the most private aspects of marriage.
Feminism has firmly established itself as a philosophy of liberation with a 
strong impact on politics through the women’s movement. The impact of 
the women’s movement through the transformation of societies, 
institutions, and individuals is of such enormous scope that Naomi Wolf 
is correct in calling it the “most successful and least bloody revolution in 
human history” (Wolf, 1993:63). However, this revolution is far from over. 
Feminism still demands serious attention for its diversity of social 
analyses and normative evaluations of institutions, practices, con­
ventions, and habits.
Can a man be a feminist? If so, what would it mean? Could it mean that 
a man simply agrees with the feminist critique of male domination and 
oppression of women in its various guises? Perhaps a feminist man 
would be one who changes his behaviour towards women so as to 
remove any semblance of dominating, oppressive, or discriminatory 
behaviour towards women. A feminist man might even feel so much guilt 
about his sexist behaviour in the past that he wholly accepts feminist 
views without critical questioning or normative evaluation.
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In this article I want to argue that the South African Constitution requires 
men to be feminist. The fundamental values of the Constitution are as 
follows. The core values of the South African Constitution are equality, 
freedom, accountability or justification, and openness. The values of the 
redress of past injustices and an improved quality of life, or the fair 
distribution of wealth, are also important focuses of the new democratic 
constitution. These values were developed in relation to South Africa’s 
unjust past and this can be explained as follows (see RSA Const., 1996: 
Preamble).
Equality stands against political institutions and actions that treated some 
citizens as being second- and third-class citizens. Discrimination on the 
basis of arbitrary characteristics such as race is rejected in the new 
South Africa. Freedom is the value guarding against political institutions 
and actions that denied black people the standard liberties of modem 
democracies in the past. A specific example is someone’s right to 
freedom and security. This right explicitly rejects detention without trial, 
torture of any kind, and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. The right 
to freedom and security of the person stamps such degrading practices 
that were perpetrated in the past as unlawful.
Accountability and justification are responses to the authoritarian style of 
government in the past. Never again should a government be allowed to 
make decisions without having to account for those decisions to its 
citizens. Government officials and their bureaucratic agents will have to 
justify their policies and actions to the citizens of South Africa to minimize 
the risk of repeating the abuse of power in the past.
Closely associated with accountability is the value of openness. The evil 
planned behind closed doors and executed in secret by government 
agents of the apartheid state against citizens was horrifying. Through 
insisting on an open democracy and openness of governmental action, 
South Africans intend to avoid the abuse of political power enabled 
through a lack of public scrutiny.
The redress of past injustices is another fundamental value underlying 
South Africa’s new constitution. South Africans have chosen to repair the 
damage created by apartheid as far as possible. The reparation of the 
damage of apartheid to the life opportunities of black people will be 
brought about by affirmative action. Property illegitimately appropriated 
by the apartheid government must either be returned or be compen­
sated. Closely associated with the redress of past injustices is the value 
of fair distribution of wealth. New governmental policies specify compre­
hensive state intervention to focus human and financial resources to 
alleviate massive poverty directly related to apartheid society’s neglect
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of black people. These policies found general acceptance and are 
strengthened by the ANC government’s use of the private initiative of 
individuals, communities and companies in addressing these issues. The 
commitment to improve the quality of life of poor people is so strong that 
socio-economic rights were included in the Constitution of 1996 to bind 
the government to the goal of alleviating poverty.
Some aspects of the public conception of justice for South Africa are still 
unclear, controversial, or not yet publicly debated. These undecided 
aspects provide opportunity for moral debate and political strategy to 
influence the direction taken. Part of the conception of justice contained 
in modern liberal democracies, like South Africa, is guaranteed oppor­
tunities for citizens to take part in revising and extending this conception. 
Feminists are exploiting these opportunities to work out what would be 
more just policies and laws for women and how men ought to behave 
more justly toward women. Attempts at modifying or extending a 
conception of justice through debate, argument, mobilization of support, 
and public demonstrations are ways of peaceful resolution of conflict.
Lasting peace in South Africa will only be possible when the country is 
fully transformed into a just society. This transformation implies two 
things. Justice requires looking back in time to undo or compensate for 
the injustice of the past. Justice further requires looking forward in time to 
establish just institutions and policies. The issues involved in the 
transformation of past injustice toward women into future peace between 
the sexes will now be outlined.
If it is true that the South African Constitution requires men to be feminist, 
what does it imply? A feminist man is one with good reason to accept 
many aspects of feminist critique of male domination and oppression that 
manifest in all spheres of life. Such acceptance must be guided by a 
dialogue between women and men on a satisfactory shared inter­
pretation of the fundamental values of justice operative in the South 
African constitutional democracy. In this article I explore some feminist 
writings with the aim of formulating a normative ideal for men in their 
relations to women that integrates the main objectives of the feminist 
critique of patriarchy with the values of justice underlying the South 
African Constitution. I intend to show that the South African Constitution 
has implications for men's relations with women that reach beyond the 
public sphere into the privacy of the household and even the bedroom 
shared by marriage partners.
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1. Men ought to take all kinds of injustice seriously
Why should South African men take feminism seriously? There are a few 
simple reasons. One reason is that men should take the injustices of 
sexism at least as seriously as any other comparable injustice in their 
society. Especially men who have experienced the injustice of racial 
oppression under apartheid ought to be sensitive to the remaining forms 
of the oppression of women. Moral consistency requires it. However, 
men might have to take feminism more seriously than other comparable 
forms of injustice. Why? One reason is that the injustices of sexism can 
affect some of the significant women in their lives. If one accepts that one 
has stronger moral obligations to the most significant people that form 
part of one's everyday life, then men ought to take the injustice of sexism 
very seriously. The special women in men’s lives are at risk of becoming 
victims of the injustices of sexism. If they love their mothers, lovers, 
wives, sisters, and daughters, or have good friends, acquaintances, or 
colleagues who are female, men themselves might become secondary 
victims of the trauma one of these women might suffer when becoming a 
victim of one or more of the injustices of sexism. Another reason for 
taking sexism seriously is that men themselves might be responsible for 
injustices of sexism toward women in their everyday lives. They thus 
have to check whether they violate the warranted claims of injustice 
expressed by feminism and are thus morally responsible for harming 
other people.
2. Women suffer from serious injustices
What kinds of injustices drive feminist concerns? Are these concerns 
substantial enough to warrant serious male attention, or are women 
merely being squeamish? The best way to present the underlying 
concerns of feminism is to show how many of women’s most important 
human rights -  embodied in the South African Constitution -  are violated 
by men. The rights in question are the rights to life, bodily integrity, 
recognition, liberty, and equality. With the exception of rights to have 
basic needs fulfilled, all the fundamental rights of scores of women are 
violated by a large percentage of men. Some detail is needed to 
sufficiently explain this point. The rights referred to in the following 
sections are those found in the Bill of Rights of the South African 
Constitution (RSA Const., 1996).
Violation of rights to  bod ily  in teg rity
The first series of human rights violations experienced by women can 
broadly be categorised as violations of their rights to life and rights to 
bodily integrity. Some women’s right to life are violated by their male 
partners (RSA Const., 1996: Art. 11). Husbands and boyfriends are re­
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sponsible for 50% of all women murdered in South Africa, while in the 
USA the figure is 33% (cf. Sterba, 1998:89). Many more women have 
their right to bodily integrity violated as well as their right to be free from 
all forms of violence (RSA Const., 1996: Art. 12, par. [1], [2]). One in six 
South African women are assaulted in their homes by their male 
partners. In Soweto one in three of the women attending medical clinics 
have been assaulted by their male partners. In the USA researchers 
estimate that 50% of all women are assaulted by their male partners at 
some or other time in their lives. Assault on women often lead to serious 
injuries like broken bones or burn wounds.
Rape as sexual violence violates not only the right to be free from all 
forms of violence and the right to bodily integrity, but also a woman’s 
right to security in and control over her body (RSA Const., 1996: Art. 12, 
par. [2] b). In South Africa 50 481 women reported to the SA Police 
Services in 1997 that they were raped. Of these cases 43% of the 
perpetrators were charged in court resulting in convictions in 8 .1 % of the 
cases. Of all reported rape cases 91.9% of the alleged perpetrators got 
away. In one study of 544 victims of rape, researchers found that 87% 
percent of the victims were physically threatened with either knives or 
guns. The perpetrators were known to their victims in 39% of the cases 
and in 52% of the cases the rape took place in either the victim ’s or the 
perpetrator’s home. Perhaps Andrea Dworkin’s (1988) comment that 
“every woman walking alone is a target” must be modified to “every 
woman alone in the presence of one or men is a target”. The plural here 
refers to the common occurrence of gang rapes in South Africa as well 
as in the USA. In the USA approximately 43% of rapes are committed by 
two or more men.
If rape is defined as sexual intercourse without the consent of the 
partner, then sexual abuse of children often comes close to being 
classified as rape. Many men abuse both their positions of power in 
households and their intimate family relationships to violate the bodies 
and minds of young girls. Through their abuse men devastatingly harm 
these girls. Andrea Dworkin (1988:140) describes the psychological harm 
as follows: “Her whole system of reality, her whole capacity to form 
attachments, her whole capacity to understand the meaning of self­
respect, is destroyed by someone she loves”. Men sexually abusing 
young girls in their trust violate the rights of those girls as children to be 
protected against maltreatment, neglect, abuse or degradation (RSA 
Const., 1996: Art. 28, par. [1] d). They also violate their rights as children 
not to be required or permitted to provide services that are inappropriate 
for a person of that child’s age (RSA Const., 1996: Art. 28, par. [1] f (i)). 
They furthermore violate the children’s rights that their well-being,
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physical or mental health or spiritual, moral or social development should 
not be placed at risk (RSA Const., 1996: Art. 28, par. [1] f (ii)).
All the different manifestations of violence against women with their 
associated set of legitimating ideas form one of the main targets of 
feminism. The seriousness of this issue is underlined by Andrea Dworkin 
(1988:175) when she says that “crimes of violence against women are 
human rights violations that occur on a massive, almost unimaginable 
scale”. James Sterba’s comment on these American statistics of violence 
against women is disturbing. What this shows, he says, is that "the 
condition of women in our society is actually that of being subordinate to 
men by force” (Sterba, 1998:90). It seems no different in South Africa. 
What makes these violations of women’s rights not to be subject to any 
kind of violence particularly worrying is that a woman's home has often 
been called the most dangerous place where she can be. A former 
Surgeon-General of the USA, Antonia Novello, said that “the home is 
actually a more dangerous place for the American woman than the city 
streets” (quoted in Sterba, 1998:89). This seems true for many South 
African women too. No wonder that feminists have investigated and 
criticized -  in the minutest detail -  the dynamics of the household and 
the legitimating ideas of household practices.
The violation of dignity
Many women suffer a second series of rights violations simply because 
they are women. In this series the main issue concerns the appropriate 
recognition of their equal worth and dignity as human beings (see RSA 
Const., 1996: Preamble, Art. 1, 10). Several issues spring to mind. Men 
often use language to belittle and degrade women. Calling women 
names, e.g. “chicks”, making remarks on their physical appearance, and 
telling jokes stereotyping certain kinds of women are obvious examples. 
Sexual harassment, which was recognized and named only in the late 
1970s (Sterba, 1998:93), has developed into a serious issue that has 
become outlawed, especially in the workplace. Women experience 
sexual harassment as humiliating, while they feel “demeaned and 
devalued” (Sterba, 1998:93).
Sexual harassment -  defined as sexual attention forced on women 
through men in positions of power over them -  shows a strong link to 
men viewing women as sex objects and treating them as if they were 
nothing more than sexual bodies designed to serve men's gratification. 
Wolf (1993:210) argues that sexual attention in the context of unequal 
power often turns a sexual gaze into something that objectifies, belittles, 
or denigrates women. In relations of equality a sexual gaze can be 
respectful and express admiration. Anita M. Superson (1993:51) inter­
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prets the message of a catcall as follows: “a catcall says not [merely] that 
the perpetrator likes the woman’s body but that he thinks women are at 
least primarily sex objects and he ... gets to rate them according to how 
much pleasure they give him”. Through offensive language, unwelcome 
sexual attention, and perceptions of women as sexual playthings 
women’s inherent dignity is violated, as well as their rights to have their 
dignity respected and protected (RSA Const., 1996: Art. 10). Their rights 
not to be treated in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way are violated too 
(RSA Const., 1996: Art. 12, par. [1] e). Ann Ferguson (1997:67) states it 
plainly, “men treat women as inferiors”. When strong women act contrary 
to this ascribed role of being inferior to men, many experience what 
Patricia Hill Collins (1997:165) says, i.e. that “aggressive, strong women 
are penalized”.
Violations of rights to liberty
A third series of rights of women that men often violate are rights to 
liberty. These violations mostly occur within marriage and the family. 
Many men try to control the movements of their partners or daughters. 
Some men coerce their partners into submission through short tempers, 
aggression, insults, or prolonged periods of silence resulting from 
refusals to discuss shared interests. In many relationships women with 
stronger personalities are bullied into submission by partners whose 
feelings of inferiority and beliefs in male superiority cannot allow women 
to be strong or independent. Through these actions men are violating 
women’s rights to the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms 
(RSA Const., 1996: Art. 9, par. [1] [2]).
Violations of the right to equality
The fourth series of rights of women frequently violated by men are rights 
to equality. Many stark inequalities between men and women provided 
the impetus that started the feminist movement. Unequal citizenship 
rights that excluded women from all forms of political participation were 
rectified in the first part of the twentieth century in Western countries. 
Unequal opportunities for education and employment are still being 
remedied in most countries. Unequal pay for work of comparable worth 
still exists, albeit far less than in the past.
Women’s struggle for equality is far from over. Two issues prove 
particularly difficult to solve. One issue is men’s persistent attitude of 
superiority. Men everywhere see themselves as the most important part 
of society and they tend to define humanity in terms of their own image. 
Nancy J. Chodorow (1997:37) describes this tendency as follows, “men 
have come to define maleness as that which is basically human, and to 
define women as not-men”. The result is that men often treat women as if
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they cannot make worthwhile contributions, especially in areas tradi­
tionally considered to belong to men. Thus, in business, sport, politics, or 
science, women are often still judged not to be equal partners of simitar 
competence. Uma Narayan (1997:175) articulates the experience of 
women that “their speech is often ignored or treated with condescension 
by their male colleagues”.
A second persistent site of women’s inequality is the household. Two 
related issues prove to be problematic. One concerns decision-making. 
Women often experience that they are not equal partners in making 
decisions about important matters in the household. Whatever role they 
get in making decisions is assigned to them by their male partner. The 
male partner’s power to do so mostly arise from cultural values about 
male superiority or the male as provider, more abundant financial means, 
or greater physical power and the threat of violence. As a result women 
still have to do the bulk of housework, regardless of their tiresome in­
volvement in raising children or their long hours in pursuit of a career as 
professional. Adding insult to injury is that most men look down on 
housework as something below them that would violate their dignity if 
they had to be known to do it. For this reason Andrea Dworkin 
(1988:121) observes that "housework is stigmatized as woman’s work”.
Through men’s unfounded attitudes of male superiority and female in­
feriority and the unequal division of household decision-making and 
duties, they violate the central thrust of the South African Constitution of 
treating people equally. Two important rights of women are at issue here. 
One is that women have the right to equal dignity (RSA Const., 1996: Art. 
10). The other right states that neither the state nor any person may 
discriminate unfairly against anyone on the grounds of, inter alia, gender, 
sex, pregnancy or marital status (RSA Const., 1996: Art. 9, par. [1], [2], 
[3], [4]).
It would be a serious mistake to suggest that all women experience the 
same violations of their rights. W omen’s experiences of men differ from 
country to country, but even within the same local community or village 
women can have different experiences of men, depending on the men in 
their lives. The diversity of women’s experiences in South Africa -  
ranging from multiple, strong forms of sexism to not even noticing sexism
-  suggest that men have diverse attitudes and actions towards women 
as well. Some men treat women with proper respect, others treat them 
with utter disrespect. Nevertheless, there are strong patterns in many 
societies -  South Africa included -  of women suffering wide-ranging 
human rights abuses that warrant serious investigation, strong protest, 
and clear rejection.
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3. Feminism fights to implement an improved conception of 
justice
Feminism is a good example of a social movement operative in many 
countries that wants to eliminate the injustices discussed in the previous 
section through redefining ideals of justice and giving those ideals new 
content. What are the shared contents of feminist movements in different 
countries? The feminist movement articulates a vision of society that 
would liberate women from their oppression and enable them to live a 
richer and more rewarding life. To reach the dream of a transformed 
society, feminists are trying to turn many issues into matters of justice, 
i.e., they want to bring private matters into the public arena as issues to 
be debated publicly, evaluated normatively, and decided collectively. I 
want to show how the central values embodied in the South African 
Constitution support some of the fundamental ideals articulated by the 
feminist movement.
To make women’s issues matters of justice feminists are trying to 
convince women that many of their frustrating problems, relationship 
difficulties, and emotional suffering are not naturally given with roles they 
simply and unavoidably have to fulfil by divine decree or according to the 
natural order. Their frustrations, difficulties, and sufferings result from 
contingent social arrangements and the values embodied in society by 
the active work of dominant male elites. Women’s blindness to seeing 
these injustices are removed by making them aware that their inferior 
position in society does not result from unalterable social conditions, 
fixed natural roles, and true ideas (cf. Okin, 1989:5-6). Rather, their 
injustices were made by humans and are maintained by men -  and 
women -  who arbitrarily define roles for women, and justify those social 
arrangements through ideas that exclude independent female perspec­
tives.
Feminism aims to create widespread awareness that many social 
problems and household conditions that are detrimental to women are 
matters of justice that call for remedy through public, collective action 
(Benhabib, 1992:109). This aim implies that feminism wants to break 
decisively with any conception of justice that excludes the household 
from being morally scrutinized by a conception of justice. The scope of 
justice is relentlessly extended by feminists to deal with any issue of 
public interest, provided it can be judged by public morality and be 
remedied by collective human action. Feminists thus want to make the 
well-being of individuals, such as a battered wife or a raped woman, 
matters of justice, despite the supposed privacy of the sphere of family 
life where these forms of violence often occur. No harm to a woman's 
life, no violation of a woman's dignity, no constraint on a woman’s
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development, nor any hindrance to a woman’s self-determination should 
be withdrawn from critical testing in terms of the public moral values 
embodied in a public conception of justice, as expressed in the 
democratic constitution of South Africa.
The target of injustice feminism aims at
What exactly is the target of injustice that feminism aims at? The target 
of feminists is sexism, the cause of their experience of suffering 
systematic social injustice as a result of their sex (c f Richards, 1994:21­
27). Sexism manifests itself as a network of ideas, attitudes, choices, 
decisions, actions, habits, practices, and institutions that privilege men 
and disadvantage women. Sexism enables men to dominate women by 
depriving women of legitimate opportunities for making their own 
decisions. Sexism also empowers men to oppress women by depriving 
them of opportunities and spaces for development and growth. Sexism 
exploits women’s group identity through ideas that legitimize men’s 
domination and oppression of women (Wolf, 1994:76). Ideas such as the 
natural roles of women as mothers and wives, women’s lesser rationality, 
women as the weaker sex, and women’s supposedly emotional nature 
have been used throughout history to justify inferior positions and dis­
respectful treatment to women.
Feminism tries to provide diagnoses and explanations o f sexism 
(Benhabib, 1992:152). Simone de Beauvoir (1997:9) said it simply: 
feminists want to know how it is "that this world has always belonged to 
the men?” Feminists want to pinpoint what they reject about sexism in all 
its minutest details. They assign responsibility for the manifestations of 
sexism by pointing out how sexism arose and how it has been main­
tained. Today the focus is on the persistent tenacity of certain sexist 
practices and the last vestiges of sexist ideas and behaviour. Through 
anticipatory-utopian critique feminists are articulating ideals of how 
society can be changed to remove the injustices women suffer from 
(Benhabib, 1992:152). In general, feminism wants to make itself super­
fluous by ridding society of sexism -  it does not have the aim to privilege 
women at the cost of men (cf. Richards, 1994:25). However, the com­
prehensive network of sexism infiltrated all nooks and crannies of society 
and thus its eradication takes time and effort To determine what must be 
done to eliminate sexism completely is an ongoing process. To find 
appropriate strategies for protest and to set agendas for transformation 
to create a society where male and female would experience liberty and 
equality of comparable worth -  as promised by the Preamble of the 
South African Constitution -  have proven to be a much bigger and more 
complex task than most people initially thought
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The struggle aginst sexism
The struggle against sexism has a particularly difficult nature. Put in war 
metaphors, both the enemies and the sites of battle make the struggle 
against sexism difficult. One kind of enemy that feminism fights is sexist 
men. Not all men are sexist. For some women, however, the enemy is a 
father, a brother, a lover, a husband, or a friend. Andrea Dworkin (1988: 
184) articulates this experience, “the enemy is family ... he is so cruel 
and so arrogant and so intimate and so close ...” . Another kind of enemy 
is just as difficult to fight. This enemy is the one within -  the sexist ideas 
and life-styles that a woman grew up with, that is difficult to get rid of if 
they played a strong role in her formative years. This enemy is often the 
cause of women themselves reinforcing sexist ideas and practices.
The sites of battle also make the struggle against sexism difficult. The 
sites where sexism must be fought could be found in any part of human 
life, whether in economy, politics, education, religion, marriage, or sport. 
Elaine Rapping (1994:17) formulates the complexities of the battle 
against sexism as follows, "ideological shifts ... take place ... in small, 
contradictory, multitudinous battles over a variety of issues in a maze of 
intertextual, contested sites”. Thus, feminists must be aware of all 
possible places and persons where the battle against sexism have not 
yet been won, while simultaneously being aware where the battle needs 
not to be fought anymore. The feminist struggle for gender justice does 
not consist of one decisive battle, but rather of numerous battles of 
different sizes and a multitude of smaller fights for territory by both 
individuals and groups.
Many battles and fights have already been won, while quite a few still 
needs to be fought. Women are not -  and never were -  mere victims of 
male domination. Throughout history there are examples of women 
“whose thought and action do not mesh with an image of downtrodden 
subordination” (Elshtain, 1981:226). Andrea Dworkin (1988:183) coun­
ters the idea of women as mere victims of sexism and celebrates the 
victories women -  as agents responsible for their own destiny -  have 
already won when she says,
... women resist; women fight back; women organize; women are 
brave; women go up to male power and stop it in its tracks; women fight 
institutions of male dominance and weaken them; women retaliate 
against rapists ...; women infiltrate male systems of power; women 
change laws ...; women provide secret refuge for battered women ...; 
sometimes women kill; women sue to stop sex discrimination; women 
claim more and more public space ...; feminists go at male power where 
it is most dangerous ...; feminists keep thinking, writing, talking, 
organizing, marching, demonstrating ...
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4. How should men respond to the feminist movement?
Men committed to the central values of the South African Constitution 
should take the feminist movement seriously and respond positively to 
the fundamental aim of feminists to eliminate all kinds of injustices that 
women suffer from. These women suffering injustice might be a man’s 
female partner, his daughter, his mother, his friend, or his colleague. Can 
a man show respect and loving care towards those who share his bed, 
his genes, his friendship, his work, and his interests if he does not take 
their experiences of suffering injustice seriously? Perhaps he can show 
loving care and respect while ignoring and perhaps even contributing to 
the injustices of the women in his life. However, that respect and loving 
care will be disfigured and eroded by the injustice contained in them. 
Gradually the loving care and respect will lose credibility and value if 
persistent requests for understanding and support in the struggle against 
injustice are ignored.
Men, as citizens of a modern constitutional democracy like South Africa, 
experience continually mounting pressures from women as their fellow 
citizens to support their struggle against sexism. In terms of the South 
African democratic constitution, women are defined as citizens of equal 
dignity who have a comprehensive set of rights to equality and liberty. To 
insist on treatment as free and equal citizens and to demand to jointly 
work out the details and implications of such treatment in all spheres of 
life seem a reasonable request. To refuse such a request from any 
citizen who wish to have nothing more than those rights already assigned 
to them in a democratic constitution rather seems unreasonable.
Men, as human beings guided in part by moral values, ought to judge the 
elimination of injustices -  that can sometimes cause grievous bodily 
harm and even death -  as a priority. South African men that take moral 
values seriously ought to have a commitment to minimize remediable 
suffering and to ensure equitable treatment of all persons, as expressed 
in the aspirations of the Preamble of the South African Constitution. They 
ought to have a fallibilist attitude of recognizing the possibilities that their 
insight into moral values and their awareness of how others experience 
their society might be flawed. Furthermore, they ought to be open to 
complaints from aggrieved citizens and be prepared to discuss the 
feelings of dissatisfaction and being wronged that some people ex­
perience. If not, they are morally insensitive and democratically non- 
responsive, thus violating the fundamental values of the South African 
constitutional democracy.
If men have moral obligations to respond positively to feminism, what 
should they do? Men should be prepared to acknowledge any aspect of
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their behaviour in their private or public lives that violate the fundamental 
values of a modern constitutional democracy. They should be prepared 
to engage feminists in dialogue about what feminists perceive to be 
wrong and unjust in terms of shared democratic values or creative 
extensions thereof. Once men have been convinced of an injustice of 
sexism, they must be willing to modify their personal behaviour and to 
make any institutional changes required to eradicate that kind of 
injustice.
The process of being challenged that some of your actions are sexist and 
thus humiliate and harm women, might be uncomfortable for some men. 
They might resist seeing the point of feminists, as they realize that 
acknowledging guilt might make them lose face or could cost them 
privileges and comforts they currently enjoy. Some men might thus 
decide to change only when forced to do so. This is an option for male 
response to feminism. Men following this option thus only react to 
feminist pressure and then only grudgingly and unwillingly. To such men 
Andrea Dworkin (1988:163) issues a simple challenge, “Why are you so 
slow to understand the simplest things? ... Simply that women are human 
to the degree and quality that you are”.
The proactive option of responding to feminism
There is another option of how men can respond to the challenge of 
feminism. This option is voluntary and proactive. It is driven by a fresh 
interpretation of the fundamental values of the South African Consti­
tution. In this case men discover women as equal partners in a moral 
quest to reinterpret the fundamental political values of their society and to 
creatively explore the implications for ensuring liberty and equality that 
satisfies everyone. In this case men are willing to listen to the most 
stringent feminist criticism and to take such criticism seriously by 
responding in earnest with high quality arguments. Such men will be 
prepared to investigate the past with feminists to determine the harm 
done to women and to explore ways of undoing or remedying at least 
some of those harms. They will also be willing to deal with the conse­
quences of injustices of the past that detrimentally affect women in the 
present.
This willingness to deal with the harms and consequences of past sexist 
injustices presuppose that such men are open to have their limited 
horizons on gender relations modified and expanded. Through prolonged 
interaction and dialogue their horizons might meaningfully fuse with the 
horizons of feminists. To reach a fusion of horizons would need never- 
ending conversations and dialogues between men and women -  in local 
settings of households to the national setting of Parliament and even to
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the global settings of international organizations like the United Nations -  
and in settings everywhere in between.
In the rest of this article I want to propose one example of reacting to the 
feminist challenge in terms of the proactive option. The question that will 
guide my exploration is as follows. What can men committed to the 
liberal-democratic values of the South African Constitution do to accom­
modate the legitimate concerns of feminists? I will present four things 
that men can do. They are as follows. Men must make specific assump­
tions about gender roles; they must extend the scope of justice to the 
household; they must develop good judgement of individuals; and they 
must communicate through genuine dialogue. I will conclude by illustra­
ting how these changes can transform relationships by using the 
marriage relationship as example.
5. Assumptions about gender roles
Men willing to take feminism seriously would have to make the 
assumption that social roles are not divinely ordained or naturally given, 
but are made by human beings interacting in communities. If South 
African citizens are granted rights like freedom of expression, religion, 
conscience, thought, and opinion, as well as rights to freedom of 
movement, freedom of association, freedom to choose a profession, and 
freedom to participate in linguistic and cultural communities of choice, 
then socially prescribed or divinely ordained roles for women can hardly 
be imagined. Simone de Beauvoir (1997) rejects the idea that gender 
roles are natural. Rather, she says, “ in human society nothing is natural” 
and a woman is thus a "product elaborated by civilization” (De Beauvoir, 
1997:10). Gender is seen as a social construction that entails far more 
than mere biological sex. For De Beauvoir (quoted in Butler, 1997:82) 
“one is not born a woman, but, rather, becomes one”. Gender as social 
construction suggests that men and women do not have fixed natures 
that will inevitably manifest themselves. Women and men can define 
themselves, create their own gender, make who they are, and specify 
who they want to become -  this much at least the liberties contained in 
the South African Constitution allow them.
The freedom o f self-creation through which people have open 
possibilities to negotiate new life-styles to express their gender and their 
individuality take place within strong constraints. There are biological 
differences that can affect conceptions of gender. A person’s genetic 
make-up similarly places constraints on what is possible for people to 
become. Perhaps even more important is Karen J. W arren’s (1997:377) 
remark that “humans are properly understood in terms of networks or 
webs of historical and concrete relationships”. Relations of power from
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the sphere of the household to the larger social sphere can significantly 
constrain people’s options to widen their conceptions of what possibilities 
they can explore to redefine their ideas of gender.
Feminists have exposed the ways that conceptions of gender have been 
moulded within the contours, limits, and power structures of patriarchal 
societies These exposures are the beginnings of an awareness that 
gender is a social construction that can be modified and changed 
through social and political struggle and protest. Feminists thus want to 
create space for women to be able to experiment with conceptions of 
gender and to creatively redefine conceptions of who they are and what 
they would want to be. Women must have the freedom -  granted by the 
South African Constitution -  to choose for themselves whatever 
characteristics and virtues they find attractive to add to their existing 
portfolio. Men must not prescribe a gender role with fixed traits to them 
that places women in the strait jacket of having to be a “lady”, for 
example.
Feminists have become aware of the ways that people are affected by 
full participation in all social spheres and different kinds of activities. Ann 
Ferguson (1997:77) articulated this awareness as follows, “aspects of 
our selves are developed by participating in social practices which insist 
on certain skills and values”. For women who had many such activities 
denied and opportunities closed to them in the past, it has become an 
exciting exploration to discover how they might develop and change. 
Development and change presuppose that people do not stay the same. 
That women -  and their conceptions of gender -  can thus change 
significantly throughout their lives has become accepted. Ferguson 
(1997:77) says that “one’s sense of self and one’s core values may 
change at different times and in different contexts”.
6. Justice and the household
If the various liberties women have, in terms of many different rights 
embodied in the South African Constitution, allow them to define their 
own roles through acts of self-creation, what would be the impact on the 
households women share with male partners? This issue needs further 
exploration. If one assumes that when people make claims for justice, 
they do so with the intention to secure for themselves treatment that 
recognises them as human beings or to gain access to conditions under 
which they can enjoy the fullest life possible for, and worthy of, human 
beings (Frankena, 1962:21, 26; Rossouw, 1995:7), then feminism’s claim 
to broaden the scope of justice makes a lot of sense. Ideals of justice in 
modern constitutional democracies motivated feminists to imaginatively 
conceptualize their society as more "liberating and enabling” and to
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evaluate current injustices in the light of such imaginary visions (Young, 
1990:35). Feminists have also reformulated some ideals of justice and 
given them new content, enabling women to revise their evaluations of 
the capacity of their society to provide them adequate space to live 
worthy lives, appropriately reflecting their human dignity.
Rawls (1971:5) points out that aspects of a conception of justice are 
always in dispute. Part of such disputes are attempts to apply currently 
accepted norms and rules of justice to new groups of people or new 
areas of human interaction. Feminists imaginatively apply the require­
ments for treating citizens as free and equal to the many complexities of 
the injustices they classify as sexist. Another aspect of the ever-present 
disputes about justice in a society is claims for the imaginative discovery 
and creative development of new ideas of justice that intend to make 
citizens aware of injustices previously not noticed. To qualify as new 
ideas of justice, these ideas must gain general acceptance in society and 
be reasonably coherent with existing, well-established ideas of justice. 
An example of that is the way in which feminists insist that the household 
must become a matter of justice as well.
A redefinition of the private and the public
The arguments for subjecting the household to critical scrutiny in terms of 
justice are all variants o f a plea for a redefinition of the boundary 
between the private and the public. Feminists reject a spatial definition of 
the private and the public that would define the household and what 
happens behinds its doors and curtains as private. They want to open up 
certain aspects of private lives for public investigation, debate, and 
evaluation. Feminists do not want to do away with the distinction 
between public and private, as both are necessary for flourishing human 
life (cf. Elshtain, 1981:322; Pateman, 1989:134). They certainly do not 
want total state intrusion into the lives of individuals. However, they do 
want to open up specific areas of private lives where men dominate and 
oppress women to bring these issues into view, make them public 
knowledge, and subject them to collective decision-making. Thus, what is 
private may imply one of the following aspects: something not to be 
observed by others, something not to become knowledge available to all 
interested persons, and something that no other persons or institutions 
other than the person involved have decision-making power. These three 
meanings of private  do not necessarily always overlap.
When feminists argue that the personal should be made political, or the 
private be made public, they obviously do not want to make intimate 
sexual acts available for public observation, but they do want to make 
phenomena like marital rape public knowledge and to be declared acts
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that are illegal so that their perpetrators can be prosecuted in court. They 
furthermore want to invite public values -  those embodied in the South 
African Constitution like liberty, equality, and human dignity -  in through 
the household door (cf. Benhabib, 1992:13) to influence even their 
private sexual acts with their partners so that both partners can act as 
equals in deeply satisfying reciprocal relationships.
Normative evaluation
Alison Jaggar (1997) argues in favour of treating the household as a 
matter that must be morally scrutinized in terms of a public conception of 
justice. She notes that many household issues have been judged to be 
natural or biologically determined and thus not subject to the dictates of a 
conception of justice. She judges this assumption of naturalness or 
biological determination to be what Stuart Hampshire calls a fallacy of 
false fixity. This fallacy consists of a representation of particular social 
arrangements as being unalterable or unavoidable features of human 
life, as they are natural or biologically determined and thus cannot be 
changed or made otherwise through deliberate, conscious human action 
(Hampshire, 1989:59). Feminists have shown that many aspects of 
household life are socially constructed and therefore these assumptions 
have been proven false. In this light the distinction between a public 
sphere subject to principles of justice and a private sphere subject only to 
the values, power, and whims of dominant males “comes to seem 
philosophically arbitrary, without reason” (Jaggar, 1997:53).
Feminists have succeeded in making several aspects of household life 
open to normative evaluation in terms of justice. In the light of this 
evaluation the household emerged as a “site of male power, a power that 
in its more benign aspects got women working excessively long hours for 
minimal reward, and in its worst could expose them to physical and 
sexual abuse” (Phillips, 1991:102). This qualifies as imaginative new 
applications of existing ideas of justice, that are reasonably coherent with 
existing, well-established ideas of justice. What qualifies as matters of 
justice are issues that can be judged in terms of public morality, are 
remediable by collective human action, and are of public interest. Public 
interest does not only mean matters that concern a broader public. The 
well-being of individuals, negatively affected by acts like violence against 
women, sexual abuse of children, or marital rape, can become public 
concerns, regardless of the privacy of family life where they take place. 
The South African Constitution expresses a strong concern about the 
well-being and dignity of citizens. To protect them from serious harm 
might force aspects of private, household life open to public inspection 
and control, like laws on domestic violence, marital rape, and child abuse 
have already indicated.
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As a result of the feminist struggle to subject households to normative 
evaluation in terms of a conception of justice based on collective de­
cision-making, Linda J. Nicholson (1997:140) says “the contemporary 
family has become a very public institution”. Feminists have focused a lot 
of attention on the justice of household life. Two reasons drive their 
interest in household justice. One is that household life constitutes a very 
important part of human life where many time-consuming duties and 
responsibilities are distributed. This distribution drastically affects the 
opportunities for human development and fulfilment available to women 
of all ages (Okin, 1989:16). Phillips (1991:102) judges that women under 
patriarchy suffered not only from the pressures and constraints that 
denied them opportunities for participation in public activities. Male 
dominance and oppression created female subordination and submission 
which made the private, personal sphere for women “as devastatingly 
destructive of our human development as anything that governments 
could do”.
If other aspects of human life are regulated by public conceptions of 
justice and fairness, why should the household be withdrawn from moral 
evaluation? Susan Moller Okin (1989:14) states one reason for the 
significance of a just family as: “the family must be just if we are to have 
a just society”. This requirement is needed because the family is at the 
“root of the moral development of individuals” and an “essential founda­
tion” of a just society (Okin, 1989:17). The family has this role because it 
provides children with formative experiences of how adults interact with 
each other and with children. Adult interaction can model justice and 
reciprocity, domination and manipulation, or unequal altruism and one­
sided self-sacrifice (Okin, 1989:17). The dominating model in a family 
strongly influences children’s ideas about how adults ought to treat one 
another in a democracy. If South Africans want to establish a deeply 
rooted human rights culture, adult interaction everywhere must model 
democratic values to children.
A consistent regard for justice in all spheres of life thus mandates the 
inclusion of the household in its scope. The role of the household in 
shaping the values and character of children gives a secondary reason 
for the urgency of feminists to examine the justice of household life, the 
primary reason being the unjust division of burdens.
Implementing democratic values in households
Values, attitudes, and behaviour learnt in the household are taken along 
into public life. For this reason ensuring appropriate implementation of 
values like liberty and equality in the household will strengthen South 
Africa’s constitutional democracy. Implementing democratic values in
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households, in the sense of imposing such values through third parties, 
might prove to be difficult. Women should rather be enabled to insist on 
being treated as democratic citizens with equal dignity and be 
empowered to claim or enforce their legitimate rights whenever those are 
threatened by their partners (cf. Phillips, 1991:111, 119). Government 
officials should step in only when serious, harmful violations of human 
rights occur (cf. Walzer, 1983:232).
7. Appropriately judging individuals
Men interact with many different women in all spheres of life, not only 
with their partners in households. How should they relate to the individual 
women they encounter in everyday life? Women have a unique position 
in society. Women as a group do not have the problems of minority 
groups whose group identities are not recognized by dominant majorities. 
On the contrary, Susan W olf (1994:76) argues, women have been 
recognized as a distinct group and their separate identity has been 
exploited by men to justify oppressing and dominating them. Women 
have also suffered from demeaning stereotypes which dismissed their 
personal qualities and competencies beforehand. For these reasons 
feminists are sensitive about appropriate recognition of women’s dignity 
and worth as human beings -  a sensitivity fully backed up by the strong 
emphasis on equal dignity for all citizens in the South African Con­
stitution. Appropriate recognition can mean different things, depending 
on the context. It seems, though, as if a broad distinction between two 
issues will satisfy feminist -  and most possibly anybody else’s -  
concerns. This distinction is between what Seyla Benhabib (1992) calls 
treating others as the generalized other and treating them as a concrete, 
specific other.
Awareness of the uniqueness of a person
Treating individuals as the generalized other implies according them 
equal respect and dignity as is due every human on the grounds of being 
a citizen of the South African constitutional democracy. Every woman 
thus also have rights to equal liberties, equal treatment, equal partici­
pation, equal opportunities, and equal consideration of her interests. 
What equality exactly means in various contexts needs to be jointly 
determined by all citizens and specified in rights, duties, laws, and 
policies.
Within the broad moral framework of treating others as the generalized 
other, there are sufficient spaces for treating others as specific, concrete 
others. The broad framework sets the minimum requirements for treating 
others who are encountered personally within a person's everyday life. In 
addition to the recognition of the general characteristics of a person’s
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humanity, a person’s concrete, specific characteristics are recognized 
and responded to. Treating people according to stereotypes is out. 
Various forms o f discrimination are rejected by the South African 
Constitution, including discrimination on the grounds of sex, gender, 
pregnancy, or marital status. The emphasis for men ought to be on 
establishing unique relationships with individual women, whatever the 
duration. Awareness of the unique features of a person through sensitive 
observation and attentive listening translates into adapting one’s 
behaviour to suit the uniqueness of a person. Carol Gilligan (1997:276) 
thus argues that justice in interpersonal relationships “becomes 
understood as respect for people in their own terms”.
Unique relationships are established through determining various factors 
of importance for establishing that relationship in a specific context. 
Features such as the following must be taken into account: the nature, 
capabilities, and characteristics of the person; the personal and political 
values of the person; the career and interests of the person, the 
circumstances and duration of the encounter, and the preceding narra­
tive of the history of their interaction. If men should treat each woman 
they encounter in whatever context in this unique way in addition to 
respecting them as the generalized other, they would show true care 
towards individual women. Carol C. Gould (1997:330) argues that care 
“translates into responsiveness to the particular needs and interests of 
individuals or groups instead of treating them all in the very same way” .
The link between justice and care
If justice in these relationships means respect for people in their own 
terms, and if that implies taking proper care of people, then an intimate 
link between justice and care becomes apparent. To care for people in 
interpersonal relationships requires resolution of several issues con­
cerning justice. Care cannot be generalized and be distributed equally, 
as every person’s unique, specific, and concrete needs must be deter­
mined (Tronto, 1989:174). Determining needs cannot be done unilateral­
ly, but only in dialogue with the person involved (Tronto, 1989:176-177). 
How much caring a person receives results from a decision that takes 
into account the “amount of time and kind of effort that a caring individual 
can expend” and the needs of the person for whom one cares (Tronto, 
1989:180). Caring relationships can easily become unequal power 
relationships where care-givers keep care-needers dependent on them, 
as care-givers might themselves need the practice of caring for others 
(Tronto, 1989:179-180). Justice in this case calls for appropriate relation­
ships between citizens of equal dignity despite the inequalities created by 
the need for care and the capacity to provide or give care.
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To treat people according to an appropriate judgement of their indivi­
duality seems almost self-evident. Carol Gilligan (1997:275) says that 
within relationships “the self as moral agent perceives and responds to 
the perception of need”. If the meaning of need can be somewhat 
stretched, one could argue that men should not treat all women the 
same, but rather be aware of the different options of what they might 
have to provide in a relationship with any woman. These options include 
partnership, care, debate, friendship, distance, support, aid, co­
operation, leadership, honour, dialogue, obedience, appreciation, love, 
emulation, and so on. Men should not, however, unilaterally decide what 
a relationship needs, as if they are experts in dominant positions. Rather, 
mutuality and reciprocity must characterise relationships between women 
and men. Through verbal -  and non-verbal -  communication, negotia­
tion, and joint decision-making women and men can establish relation­
ships of various kinds which both affirm aspects of their individuality and 
their shared humanity and for which they share responsibility.
8. Communication through genuine dialogue
Dialogue is the most appropriate medium for women and men -  
regardless of the nature of their relationship -  to sort out feminist issues 
and to redefine their relations. Dialogue can be used in ordinary 
interaction, for decision-making, and for the resolution of conflict. Dia­
logue works particularly well for relationships experienced as shared 
projects where it enables genuine communication at deep levels. Dia­
logue can thus enable understanding between partners, problem-solving, 
and growth in their relationships. Why is dialogue so appropriate?
Dialogue is a means of human communication that allows people to 
exchange views, present ideas, and express feelings in a process that 
treats each partner with equal respect and provides every partner with an 
equal opportunity to have their interests considered. Partners get a 
reasonable opportunity to state their case while others listen attentively 
and take them seriously. Dialogue thus provides every participant the 
opportunity to make their unique voice heard. Accommodating unique­
ness leaves room for opening up and revealing differences. Differences 
are dealt with in the context of dialogue as mutual quest for reciprocal 
understanding and new perspectives on both the topic under discussion 
and on one another. Participants in dialogue must thus be able to 
tolerate differences and accept that full consensus is not the only 
possible aim of dialogue, nor should it be seen as the only worthwhile 
outcome of dialogue.
Dialogue only occurs when participants are equal partners who articulate 
their own interests and listen with appropriate attention to what others
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have to say. In dialogue the agenda is open and determined by good 
arguments presented by participants in favour of discussing specific 
issues. Adequate time must be assigned for dialogue so that issues can 
be properly debated to the satisfaction of all concerned. A  commitment to 
co-operate in a process of problem-solving provides the impetus to 
continue searching for adequate solutions. Participants in dialogue must 
be prepared to learn and grow through the process of dialogue. To do so, 
they must be willing to listen to criticism of themselves and their views 
and modify themselves and their positions if good arguments warrant 
that. Modification is sometimes not enough, as new options might be 
needed, or equitable, principled compromises must be sought.
Equal partners in dialogue
Participants in a dialogue must regard one another as equal partners 
who deserve equal respect and consideration in the process of dialogue. 
Unequal relations of power can distort and destroy dialogue if the more 
powerful abuse their power to talk down to their supposed inferior 
partners. In a dialogue the exercise of power over others must be 
temporarily suspended for the duration of the dialogue. Susan Bordo 
(1998:25) writes grippingly about her dialogues with her father. She 
refers to these dialogues as “this conversation, an equal dialogue ... 
between an elderly man and a five-year old girl” . What particularly 
empowered Bordo was the way her father regarded her as worthwhile 
listening and responding to. So partners in dialogue ought to do.
Psychological bullying tactics
Men are not particularly adept at engaging in sustained dialogue over a 
long period about all important issues with the women in their lives. Many 
men would rather punish women with long periods of silence, refusals to 
discuss matters, psychological bullying tactics, undermining their part­
ner's self-image and self-confidence, and using violence or threats of 
violence to intimidate and force women into submission to their authority. 
Unequal physical, financial, or other kinds of power easily convert into 
dominance that silences dialogue. Unequal power can also scar dialogue 
when the dominant party sets the agenda unilaterally and thus constrains 
dialogue. In such cases, Nancy Fraser (1997:370) says, “deliberation 
[dialogue] can be a mask for domination”.
In other cases unequal power in dialogue is the result of one partner 
using superior abilities of formulation for gaining unfair advantages Many 
people, and especially oppressed and formerly oppressed groups, might 
be handicapped here. Fraser (1997:370) points out that “subordinate 
groups can sometimes not find the right voice or words to express their 
thoughts”. Further impediments that can ruin dialogue are the tendency
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of men to talk far more than women and thus to deprive them of their 
rightful opportunities to state their case and make themselves heard. 
Interruptions, cutting speakers or dialogue short, and silencing partici­
pants are more ways of derailing genuine dialogue. Fraser (1997:370) 
articulates these threats to dialogue neatly when she states that “men 
tend to interrupt women more than women interrupt men; men also tend 
to speak more than women, taking more turns and longer turns; and 
women’s interventions are more often ignored or not responded to than 
men’s”. Many men would thus have to familiarize themselves anew with 
the rules of dialogue to move away from an adversarial style to a more 
co-operative style.
9. Sort out specific feminist issues
Men prepared to engage in dialogue with women as equal partners have 
an open invitation from feminists, says Sandra Harding (1998:182), "to 
work out for themselves, in dialogue with women feminists, a creative 
transformation that could have widespread consequences for social 
relations”. What would be on the agenda of this kind of dialogue? One 
issue would be women’s experiences of injustice. Another issue would 
be women’s work. How men ought to look at or view women would also 
be important, as would men’s role in the feminist struggle.
The willingness to listen to women as equals
To treat women as both equal citizens and as unique individuals with 
whom they are willing to engage in dialogue with open agendas, implies 
that men ought to be willing to listen to women’s free, unhindered voices. 
Through listening to women as equals who relate their experiences of 
injustice and the value of so-called "women’s work”, men have the 
opportunity to come to a deep understanding of the main concerns 
driving feminism. Larry May (1998:344) thinks that men need to spend 
time "interacting with women in non-dominating ways to learn from them 
what it is like to be oppressed”. Through the ensuing dialogue between 
women and men, sensitively setting up clear links between women’s 
experiences of injustice and new, jointly determined interpretations of 
liberal democratic values, women's violated human dignity can be 
restored and healed. Through these kinds of dialogue many men will lose 
the blind spots that prevent them from seeing the injustices women suffer 
from and thus be able to see their roles in maintaining those injustices.
If men can succeed in listening to women in a way that makes women 
feel listened to, Sandra Harding (1998:180) suggests they will develop 
moral motivation for using the insight they gain critically to “rethink the 
institutions of society, their cultures and their practices". One example 
will illustrate the point. Men have dominated politics for centuries and in
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the process have set the political agenda attuned to those issues 
important to them. Carol C. Gould (1997:335) pleads for a political 
androgyny which would mean both a joint setting of the political agenda 
by women and men, as well as a greater role for women and their skills 
in politics. She (Gould, 1997:334) defines political androgyny as follows, 
"an importation into the public domain ... of the range of capacities, 
concerns, and values deriving from women's historical experience, as a 
corrective for the predominance in public life of historically male concerns 
and values”.
Such reinterpretations of public institutions in the light of women’s 
experiences of injustice must be extended to reinterpretations of men’s 
individual lives, values, and behaviour. Men ought to modify their self­
understandings and identity in the light of morally justified feminist claims 
to justice. A specific claim to justice that might cause a considerable 
rethink on the part of men is women’s demand that so-called “women’s 
work” must be appropriately recognized. But more than recognition is 
demanded. Women also want men to experience the benefits of 
women’s work, especially raising children, and they insist on a more 
equitable distribution of the burdens involved.
Involvement in mothering functions
One of the burdens often forced on women is raising children. Women 
want men to share this burden, but also to experience the numerous 
benefits of caring for children. Feminists, like Sara Ruddick (1989), have 
no doubt that mothering children is a worthwhile activity from which men 
can benefit. Her analysis of mothering indicates three demands that 
mothers of children must fulfil. One is the satisfaction of basic needs and 
protection of children through loving care. Children also demand edu­
cation and nurturance in the sense of stimulating and guiding emotional 
and intellectual growth. Mothers also have to train their children to 
become socially acceptable. To fulfil these demands, mothers must be 
able to think! Ruddick (1989) judges maternal thinking to be a distinct 
discipline which has characteristic intellectual capacities, judgements, 
attitudes, and values. A mother, Ruddick (1989:24) argues, “asks certain 
questions ..., she accepts certain criteria for truth ..., she cares about the 
findings ..., establishes criteria for determining failure and success, sets 
priorities, and identifies virtues ...”
The complexities of mothering involve more. Virginia Held (1987:U S - 
119) argues that mothering is as creative as manufacturing new products 
or producing innovative ideas. Mothering shapes a new individual’s 
language, culture, and social skills, making a child literate to become a 
competent participant in a human community. Mothering also develops
530 Koers 65(4) 2000:507-540
H P. P. Lotter
moral values in a new individual that translates into appropriate caring 
relationships. Adult mothering needs to make itself superfluous through 
leading children to become autonomous, interdependent persons with 
their own unique identities. Held (1997) points to the complex 
judgements mothering requires to gradually guide and empower a child 
towards growing privacy, autonomy, and self-reliance within relationships 
of constantly shifting interdependence.
Men can gain several advantages if they become involved in a parenting 
role that includes mothering functions. Deeper attachments to their 
children, joy at the growth and development of a child, and inner satis­
faction gained through selfless service are some. Judith Kegan Gardiner 
(1998:268) puts it thus,
T he  fa th e rs  w h o  do  d a ily  care , chang ing  d ia p e rs  and fe e d ing  th e ir  
ch ild ren , fe e l th e m se lve s  re lied  on, not m e re ly  as  occa s io n a l exc iting  
v is ito rs , and th e y  becom e in tim a te ly  a tta che d  to  th e ir  ch ild ren . T he ir 
fe e lin g s  th a t th e y  a re  good fa th e rs , ... m ay  enh an ce  th e ir  ow n es teem  
and se n se  o f accom p lish m e n t.
Feminists warn men involved in parenting to stay modest about their 
newly adopted roles. Men still have a choice of getting involved in caring 
for their children, unlike women who are socialized into child-caring roles 
as their “natural roles” they are obligated to fulfil. In most cases women 
are the ones with final responsibility for children, without any significant 
choice and whether they want to or not. Some men’s modest involve­
ment thus not yet equalizes the responsibilities and burdens of child 
care.
Once men understand some of women’s issues and experiences better 
and have chosen to treat women with the respect due to equal citizens 
and with the recognition due to unique individuals, they can view women 
with a complex judgement that has many significant values and factors 
involved. New ways of viewing women would exclude stereotyping, but 
include seeing women as equals. Furthermore, treating women as 
individuals would bring awareness of all kinds of differences that must be 
respected and appropriately responded to. Men must become able to 
see that some women are like them in important respects, e.g. in being a 
philosopher. Simultaneously they must be aware that there might be 
differences between them, e.g. different roles in family life.
The correct response to similarities and differences
Where and when to respond to similarities and differences can be 
intuitively grasped and sensitively applied in some cases, whilst being 
aware of the other person’s reaction and feedback. In other cases the 
nature, conditions, and boundaries of relationships need to be negotiated
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to reach mutual consent about appropriate behaviour. Feminism will 
have reached an important goal if men would judge women just like they 
judge other men -  continually determining what relationship is possible 
with another person based on all relevant characteristics and circum­
stances. Then women could say, as Simone de Beauvoir (1997:11) 
suggests, “she would seek ... merely a comrade, a friend, a partner, ... a 
relation between equals”, regardless which sphere of life or what kind of 
human activity forms the context.
In an open dialogue between women and men about women’s 
frustrations with the systematic injustice men perpetrate against women 
as a distinct group in society, many men may deny any role in committing 
or perpetuating injustice against women. Some men might truly be 
blameless. In their case, Andrea Dworkin (1988) says, they need to 
communicate their innocence to other men in the hope of changing those 
men to relinquish their sexist life-styles. Similarly, Dworkin advises men 
who openly express their commitment to equality in the company of 
feminists to  make that commitment true in relation to the women they 
deal with everyday. Men sharing a commitment to feminist ideals are 
welcome to participate in the feminist struggle, but are cautioned to play 
a supporting role rather than trying -  again! -  to take over women’s own 
struggle. Harry Brod (1998:202) argues in support of men’s background 
role by saying that “ insights about gender will more reliably come from 
women than from men”, which makes intuitive sense.
There is no doubt that many men resist transformation guided by 
legitimate feminist aims, because such transformation could undermine 
ideas and roles they grew up with and judge to be as natural as 
breathing. Often men are willing to change in some areas of their lives, 
but not others, as Naomi W olf (1993:27) describes, “Some men are 
egalitarians at home and patriarchalists at work, or egalitarians with their 
daughters and patriarchalists with their w ives”. David A. Kahane (1998: 
2 2 2 ) articulates how disruptive legitimate feminist claims to justice might 
be on men, “he’d lose his sense of secure grounding in the world -  his 
faith in his own judgements, emotions, and desires. Every aspect of his 
self would become suspect ...” . Lengthy dialogue between women and 
men exploring all issues in depth, awareness of how human relations 
and institutions are constructed and reproduced, and shared inter­
pretations of the public values embodied in the South African Constitu­
tion, ought to deal with such problems.
10. Practical application: Marriage
One of the favourite slogans of the feminist movement is “the personal is 
political”. Okin (1989:124) calls this slogan the core idea of contemporary
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feminism and Elshtain (1981:202) describe the overriding imperative of 
feminists as the attempt to “redefine the boundaries of the public and 
private, the personal and political”. I have earlier argued in favour of an 
extension of the scope of justice that would bring various aspects of 
household life under public moral evaluation. I have also argued that 
women must be judged as unique individuals within a broader framework 
that entails treating women as citizens of equal human dignity and worth. 
In the light of these arguments, the feminist slogan can be extended, “If 
the personal is political, then let’s politicize the personal” I want to take 
marriage as an example of how this would work.
What benefits would result if the central political values embodied in the 
South African Constitution were applied to marriage relationships? Would 
politicizing marriage relationships provide reason for sensitive romantics 
to shudder or would it liberate marriage to become a secure space where 
two consenting adults of equal dignity can establish a reciprocally de­
fined, meaningful, enriching, and mutually rewarding relationship? I hope 
to establish the second option. To do this, I first apply the rights, that the 
South African constitution grants to women as equal citizens, to marriage 
relationships. Next I apply dialogue as the preferred style of human com­
munication to decision-making in marriage relationships. Lastly I draw 
some implications for sex in marriage.
It seems absurd to suggest that a woman as citizen of a liberal 
democracy leaves her human rights, granted to her by her country’s 
constitution, outside when she enters the home she shares with her 
partner in marriage. For what reason could a marriage relationship nullify 
her right to life so that her husband could murder her? Could any reason 
nullify her right to be free from all forms of violence, so that her husband 
could physically abuse her if he thinks she needs to be “disciplined”? Any 
suggestion that marriage implies a relationship where one or both 
partners have no human rights like these against the other seems almost 
too incomprehensible to consider.
Carole Pateman (1989:219) correctly asks whether a person can be “at 
one and the same time, a free democratic citizen and a wife who gives 
up a vital aspect of her freedom and individuality, the freedom to refuse 
consent and say ‘no’ to the violation of the integrity of her person?” Anne 
Phillips (1991:30) is even more blunt in her remark that feminists stress 
that “ inequalities in marriage and the household make a nonsense of 
equal political rights”. She argues that women’s experiences in their 
households “continually undercut the possibilities for democracy” and 
thus political equality requires “substantial changes in the domestic 
sphere” (Phillips, 1991:99-100).
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If rights to life and to be free from violence apply inside marriage as 
much as they do outside, what about other rights? Should they not be 
fully valid in marriage relationships as well? A right similar to the one to 
be free from all forms of violence is that no person may be treated in a 
cruel, inhuman, or degrading way. Could there be good reasons to grant 
a marriage partner the freedom to treat the other partner in this way? Or 
should one rather suggest that a liberal democratic state protecting its 
citizens from cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment in the public 
sphere ought to have an interest in protecting them in the private sphere 
as well? Once cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment manifests in a 
marriage relationship, true love takes a back seat or has disappeared. In 
such cases the state ought to intervene to protect the suffering partner 
from severe physical or psychological harm. If this is the case, then 
marriage partners ought to have such rights against one another.
The argument underlying the remarks about human rights and marriage 
thus far is the following. A marriage relationship does not nullify the 
human rights citizens in any modern constitutional democracy are accor­
ded by the constitutions operative in their countries. If this idea is con­
vincing as far as rights go that intend to prevent serious harms, what 
about other rights? If “everyone” has the right to make decisions 
concerning reproduction, it is difficult to see what kind of reason can take 
that right away from a woman in marriage (RSA Const., 1996: Art. 12, 
par. [2] a). It is unthinkable that her husband could make this decision for 
her, as that would place her in a position of a minor in relation to her 
husband -  clearly not justifiable to a free and equal citizen. At most a 
woman could be required to make a joint decision about reproduction 
with her husband, based on dialogue that leads to consensus. This 
consensus must not result from any form of coercion or intimidation. In 
cases where partners fail to reach consensus, the right of “everyone” to 
make decisions concerning reproduction comes alive again to protect the 
women against being coerced or forced into something that radically 
affects her body.
Similar arguments can be made for rights to privacy, freedom of thought, 
expression, association, movement, and protest that women have 
according to the South African Constitution. These rights ought to trump 
any other considerations that would allow one partner to dominate and 
rule the personal life of an equal citizen assigned all the customary 
democratic liberties by a country’s constitution. Only in cases when a 
partner voluntarily waives a right without any coercion or intimidation 
involved, can a marriage be considered to be free from the demands of 
such rights. Waiving rights simply to “preserve the peace”, which mostly 
means keeping a dominating partner satisfied so that the partner does
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not do further harms, already suggests a relationship where coercion and 
intimidation have invaded spaces for free decision-making.
If marriage is a relationship between two free and equal citizens with all 
their human rights operative in their relationship, then how ought they to 
make decisions about their shared interests and responsibilities? The 
process of decision-making lies at the root of most cases of marital 
oppression and many deep frustrations result when that process is unfair 
and privileges one partner at the expense of the other. This process of 
decision-making is important as a result of the wide range of issues it 
potentially draws within its scope.
Marriage partners share most of the following interests and responsi­
bilities about which decisions must be made. They must manage their 
own love relationship by spending time together, giving each other 
sufficient attention of the right kind, and taking care of each other as 
need arises. Their sexual relationship is linked to all the issues previously 
mentioned, but include intimate and private aspects of their bodies, 
minds, and values as well, making it a particularly sensitive area. Sexual 
relationships mostly lead to offspring that place high demands in terms of 
resources and care. A wide range of issues needs to be decided, the 
division of joys, responsibilities, and burdens that care for children 
requires from both marriage partners. Marriages are about many more 
kinds of human relations, of which relations with in-laws, friends, and 
colleagues have not even been mentioned as shared interests! Marriage 
partners -  depending on their socio-economic status -  also share 
various kinds of assets, that may include a residence, household goods, 
vehicles, a garden, investments, and so on. Their assets need care, such 
as maintenance, cleaning, administration, and replacement.
How do two free and equal South African citizens in a marriage 
relationship divide the benefits and burdens of their shared interests and 
responsibilities? In the light of the strong value of autonomy underlying 
the human rights of the South African constitutional democracy, the 
marriage partners must make those decisions for themselves without 
being prescribed to from outside their relationship. If they have the 
responsibility to make out these issues for themselves, there is no other 
way than joint decision-making based on dialogue. Both partners must 
be willing to submit to this process and abide by its outcomes. If they 
realistically determine their individual strengths and weaknesses, recog­
nize their talents, and take account of their available time, they ought to 
be able to reach a fair division of benefits and burdens that would be 
appropriate for their personal characteristics and circumstances.
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Someone might object that marriage partners have no mechanism to 
break deadlocks when they strongly disagree, as they would always be 
stuck with their voting resulting in a tie. This objection fails to take 
account of the context of decision-making. Decision-making in marriage 
is not only between two partners responsible for shared interests and 
duties. The partners making decisions are not only equal partners, but 
also friends and lovers. Autocratic decisions against the will of a partner 
and negatively affecting that partner’s life will have repercussions on their 
friendship, their love life, and sexual relations. Sichtermann (1986:10) 
eloquently formulates the link between sex and other aspects of 
marriage:
A n  o rg a sm  is the  las t in a ch a in  o f e xp e rie n ce s , o f im ages , d ream s, 
long in g s  and  a n x ie tie s , a ll se n sa tio n s  w h ich  un fo ld  o u ts id e  th e  b e d ­
room . It is th e  las t in a cha in  o f im p re ss io n s , e xp e c ta tio n s , d is a p p o in t­
m en ts , su rp rise s , lo o ks  and touches .
Sichtermann continues to explicitly link women’s problems in experien­
cing orgasm to the “time, behaviour, and experience before the event” 
(Sichtermann, 1986:11). Mistreating a partner in decision-making will 
thus have its own penalties. Integrity in marriage is thus required, treating 
a partner according to the same values and with the same respect 
throughout all dimensions of marriage.
W hat implications does a view of marriage as an institution limited by 
both partners’ human rights, where decision-making takes place on the 
basis of equal partners engaging in dialogue, have for sex between the 
partners? Although sex is an “archetypically private act,” Jane Mans- 
bridge argues that “patterns of sexual interaction encode and maintain 
patterns o f unequal power that reverberate beyond the private realm" 
(Mansbridge, 1993:64). Equality -  or its absence -  in a relationship can 
make a major difference to sexual relations. In a marriage relationship 
where a husband strongly dominates, the sexual act resembles sex 
between cattle. No foreplay, no mutuality, no elegance, and no sensitivity 
is involved. Only a brief penetration when the cow allows the bull when 
she intuitively knows that she is physiologically ready for the act. Simone 
de Beauvoir (1997:12) eloquently articulates this kind of sex between 
humans:
[a ] w o m an  fe e ls  h e rs e lf p ro fo u n d ly  p a ss ive  in th e  se xu a l ac t ... [they] 
s till e n v isa g e  th e ir  e ro tic  life  fro m  th e  s ta n d p o in t o f th e  tra d itio n  o f 
s lave ry , s in ce  it se e m s to  them  h u m ilia tin g  to  lie  be n ea th  th e  m an, to  be 
p e n e tra te d  by  h im , th e y  g ro w  te n se  in fr ig id ity .
In contrast to sex between cattle, ostriches show a different approach. 
Eloquent foreplay consisting of a dazzling display of black and white 
feathers in a lover’s dance precedes the sexual act to which the female
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gives explicit consent. This comparison is much closer to sex between 
equal human partners, although still much poorer in content and 
meaning. Perhaps ostrich lovemaking still have too much of males being 
the desiring subjects who are to become conquerors of the females, 
while the females play too much of the role of seductress who are 
content to be the desired object (cf. Sichtermann, 1986:7-11).
Equality in human sexual relations requires more than eloquent foreplay 
between desiring conquerors and desirable seductresses. Sichtermann 
(1986:12) argues for expansive sexual roles without firmly set patterns, 
but rather consisting of “possible behaviour patterns with room for an 
array of behaviour patterns”. In such roles, women and men would both 
be subject and object, desirer and the desired, as some of the 
possibilities to be played out during sexual interaction. As a result, 
sexuality would become a “union of male-female activity and passivity” 
(Sichtermann, 1986:119). In sexual relations characterized as being 
reciprocally interdependent, both partners would be deeply satisfied. In 
relations of domination where men deny women opportunities to express 
their desires and to actively explore their own fulfilment, both partners 
are harmed (Sichtermann, 1986:119). If one partner is deprived of free­
doms and opportunities enjoyed by the other, both will suffer, as the level 
of sexual satisfaction experienced by one partner is strongly affected by 
the satisfaction -  or lack thereof -  experienced by the other (Sichter­
mann, 1986:119).
Where human sexuality have open spaces within a secure relationship, 
partners can be themselves with someone they trust implicitly. They can 
reveal their innermost being in a relationship where emotional intimacy 
exists that enables them to share their deepest feelings with their 
partner. As equal partners they take the initiative in turn to guide their 
partner to deeper levels of intimacy and pleasure that enrich their shared 
love. De Beauvoir (1997:12) articulates this kind of sex from her 
viewpoint as a w om an ,"... she, like him, is a consenting, a voluntary gift; 
they live out in their several fashions the strange ambiguity of existence 
made b o d y ...".
11. Feminist men in South Africa?
How should South African men react to legitimate feminist claims to 
justice that are supported by the central values of the South African 
Constitution? Should men grudgingly grant women new spaces justified 
by their legitimate claims to justice, or should they willingly and gladly 
give women the spaces owed them long ago? To “grudgingly grant” 
suggests a willingness to allow women in new spaces and to give them 
their legitimate places. What is noticeably absent is a new attitude
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welcoming women to full status as equals and rejoicing about the 
elimination o f injustice. To “willingly and gladly give” suggests changed 
ideas and attitudes about women that welcome them as full and equal 
partners who have been liberated from oppression and domination. 
Feminist men are men with this attitude.
Must South African men become “feminist men”? If a feminist man 
means a man docilely accepting feminist views, no. Such a man would 
be too confused by the wide variety of feminist theories currently 
available. If a feminist man means a man that constructively engage 
feminists in dialogue as equal South African citizens with the aim of 
addressing their claims to justice in partnership with them, then the 
answer is yes. Yes, if you like to be labelled or to be placed in a 
category; if not, a feminist man can simply be called a person who has 
become more human through eliminating injustice that he might have 
been co-responsible for, through having more meaningful relations with 
women as equals, and through deeper appropriation and implementation 
of the shared public values South Africans chose as foundational for their 
society.
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